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Farago: Function Without Form: The Asymmetrical Hermeneutics of Jesse Cho

ESSAYS AND REVIEWS
FUNCTION WITHOUT FORM: THE ASYMMETRICAL
HERMENEUTICS OF JESSE CHOPER
INTRODUCTION: ON THE VIRTUES OF THEORY

I don't know very much about the depth psychology of others
who spend a substantial portion of their time pondering abstract
jurisprudential questions, but, as for me, I live in a near-perpetual
state of self-doubt. In my fantasies, colleagues deride me because my
footnotes are bereft of case law. Alumni at imagined cocktail parties
harangue me with demands for more "practical" courses in law
school. Students accost me, in dreams from which I awaken sweaty
and shaken, demanding to know what relevance there is to the
material I teach. My classmates from law school, almost all of them
safely ensconced in the lucrative (and, they say, intellectually
challenging) practice of law, attend imaginary reunions to which I
am not invited because I am not really a lawyer.
Jesse Choper's JudicialReview and the National Political Process' therefore comes as something of a relief. It is an extended, if
backhanded, demonstration of the important role that theory must
play in any coherent argument about the substantive content of law.
Choper scrupulously, and I believe intentionally, relies on arguments
that sound in observation, practice, functionalism, and authority,
avoiding totally any consideration of fundamental underlying theory.
In so doing, and particularly in trying to apply such arguments to
answer complex questions of constitutional policy, he ultimately
lapses into a most revealing incoherence.
Each strand of his argument is carefully crafted and his erudition is beyond question. Indeed, he has an encyclopedic grasp of the
case law, an admirably practical orientation, and an eminently
reasonable claim to relevance. There can be no doubt that Professor
Choper is a real lawyer. But is he writing about real law?
I think not, and perhaps he doesn't either. After all, the title of
his book does not mention law, but only "political process," and it is
hard to cavil with his arguments if they are to be viewed as descrip1.

J. Choper, Judicial Review and the National Political Process (1980).
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tive of the sociological nexus that constitutes contemporary politics.
Unfortunately, law and politics are not the same thing. Law is an
abstract system of normative justification. The political process is a
mechanism for the allocation and implementation of social clout. I
may or may not change my behavior because the law requires, forbids, or permits me to do some thing.' But if I am called on to
legitimate my behavior, law is one response open to me.' Perhaps it
is not an ultimate justification -perhaps I cannot rely on legality to
guarantee ethical rectitude-but it is always a first step and often a
sufficient one." Political considerations, on the other hand, have no
prima facie aura of legitimacy. It is hardly a justification in any normative sense to say that the reason I voted for a piece of legislation
in which I did not believe was that doing so was politically astute. If
my acts are required by law I can claim that they are probably right
(or at least not wrong). But if they are required by politics, then
their propriety is irrelevant and the best I can say of them is that
they are probably cunning.
So Professor Choper most likely sought to write a cunning
book, one that would manipulate the political process to yield outcomes that he found desirable. And measured against this yardstick
he is eminently successful: His arguments lead him to conclude that
the United States Supreme Court should be the final arbiter of
some, but by no means all, constitutional questions. Specifically, it
should uphold constitutionally-guaranteed individual rights against
government,' it should referee disputes in which a litigant claims
that a state has trespassed on the powers awarded the federal
government in Article I,6 and it should adjudicate cases in which the
constitutional power of an Article III court is somehow thrown into
question by an act of the legislative or executive branch.' The Court
should keep its jurisprudential fingers off those cases that involve
2. See J. RAZ, THE AUTHORITY OF LAW (1979); Griffiths, Is Law Important?,
54 N.Y.U.L. REV. 339 (1979); Symposium, Law and Obedience, 67 VA. L. REV. # 1 (1981).

3. In fact, even states almost never legitimate their behavior on the basis of
power. See J. BRIERLY, OUTLOOK FOR INTERNATIONAL LAW 5 (1944).
4. A model of the general process of legitimation under the law is provided
by Ronald Dworkin. R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 14-130 (rev. paperback ed.,

1977). Under this model, law is built out of, and is therefore often consistent with, morality. There are, however, exceptions. Id. at 206-22 (civil disobedience), 326-27 (fundamentally unjust political systems). Some of David A.J. Richards' recent work is an attempt
to mesh constitutional adjudication with normative theory. See, e.g., Richards, The Individual, the Family, and the Constitution, 55 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1 (1980).
5. J. CHOPER. supra note 1, at 60-128.

6. Id. at 205-11.
7. Id. at 380-415.
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congressional incursion into constitutional rights allegedly held by
the states,8 and those that involve squabbles between the two nonjudicial branches of the federal government.' Basically, this would
eliminate National League of Cities v. Usery,0 a handful of cases in
which the Court deemed it prudent to intervene in a battle between
the other coordinate branches,' and a vast body of case law in which
the Court upheld Congress' right to act pursuant to its own interpretation of Article I" (though, as a practical matter, Choper in fact
accords that interpretive right to Congress). 3
Professor Choper's argument has all the visceral appeal of a
schematic diagram. It is laid out clearly, if pallidly: He first urges
that judicial review is antimajoritarian and therefore somehow problematic.'" He then suggests that, even so, there are powerful
pragmatic reasons why judicial review is essential to the vindication
of individual rights." Having determined that the Supreme Court
should hear cases in which such rights are implicated, he notes that
its practical power to do so is undermined by the fragility of the
Court's position. 6 In part because the Court is in fact antimajoritarian, and in part because there will always be a loser for every
winner before it, he recognizes an inevitable spiralling social hostility to the Court's decisions which weakens its forcefulness in its allimportant duty to vindicate individual rights. 7 For those
reasons- fragility and antimajoritarianism-he proposes that the
8. Id. at 171-205.
9. Id. at 260-379.
10. 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
11. The most significant of these cases is Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v.
Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
12. Notably included are such civil rights cases as Heart of Atlanta Motel v.
United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964), and Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964).
13. J. CHOPER, supra note 1, at 175. Choper seems to argue that these cases
should have been held nonjusticiable, but he explicitly embraces their outcomes and
argues that the Court should enforce such outcomes even as it determines them to be
non-justiciable. Text accompanying note 70 infra.
14. Id. at 4-59; accord J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980). Ely's book, like
Choper's, is in many ways motivated by an attempt to reconcile judicial review with
democratic theory.
15. J. CHOPER. supra note 1, at 60-128; but cf. J. ELY, note 14 supra. Although
Ely and Choper seem to agree on which fact patterns are the most important ones,
they describe the conceptual nature of those cases very differently. Choper believes
that they sound in substantive individual rights, while Ely believes them to be procedural political rights. The distinction may be more semantic than qualitative. Note
46 infra.
16. J. CHOPER, supra note 1, at 129-70.
17. Id. at 156-60, 164-68.
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Court should stay away from the resolution of all issues that it can
reasonably avoid. The test is simple: Can the specific issue be properly resolved by majoritarian means? If so, then the fragility of the
Court, if not the importance of democratic theory, requires that it
not be subject .to judicial review. Professor Choper nominates two
broad groups of cases that fail the test but have nevertheless
generally been held to be justiciable, cases involving congressional
incursions into states' rights 8 and those involving constitutional battles between the legislature and the executive. 9 He concludes with
an argument explaining why he feels that the Court should be involved in separation of powers cases in which the judicial branch is
a party.'
Professor Choper's arguments are thus doubly clever. First,
they yield an outcome which, at its core, should consistently please
at least the liberals among his readers by simultaneously upholding
both the Court's rights-based decisions and the Congress' incursions
into areas that were once deemed to be the sovereign responsibility
of the individual states. Second, they provide a basis for avoiding at
least some of the cases that would otherwise reveal the Court's surprising powerlessness. By permitting Congress and the President to
slug out their disputes without the bother of a referee, Choper
eliminates one class of cases in which it might become evident that
the Court's magic is mere legerdemain. If the Court keeps out of
these constitutional crises, it will sacrifice less of its credibility with
the other branches.2' And by maintaining its credibility (read
-popularity) the Court can continue to count on both Congress and
the President to help enforce the decisions about which Choper
cares.
All of this amounts, as I have suggested, to a dandy political
argument. It presents a political system whose outcomes are congruent with those that many of us would like to see, and whose
dynamics look very familiar. If we were social engineers seeking to
design a judicial machine that would start with our contemporary
social norms and produce a specific set of desired political holdings,
we could hardly ask for anything better. And Choper seems, in part
at least, to believe that that is his task, since he devotes considerable ink to a delineation of the multifarious desirability of the
outcomes his proposed machine would produce. But such a concen18.
19.
20.
21.

Id
Id
Id
Id

at
at
at
at

171-205.
260-379.
380-415.
129-70.
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tration on product rather than process, taken alone, can never be a
satisfactory basis for urging the Court to adopt new or variant doctrines.
We are citizens in the polity. Instead of a machine that stamps
outcomes out of fact patterns, we want a system that assures the
legitimacy of the outcomes it reaches. Superior firepower, not conceptual rigor, is probably the best way to ensure that we get the
behavioral results we desire. But if we want something more-if we
want a source of authority as well as of power and if we want the
behavior we produce to be not merely manifest but also
legitimate-then our arguments must be primarily theoretical and
only secondarily political.'
That is the implicit message of Professor Choper's heroic attempt to substitute political procedure for legal process, functionalism for formal argument. It is a conclusion that emerges for
the reader who must wonder why it is that a book so carefully
wrought, so precisely (if not sparely) written, so detailed, and so
meticulously argued, nevertheless does so little to convince the
skeptic.
MAJORITARIANISM AS AN END-IN-ITSELF

23

There are both technical and jurisprudential problems with the
first (and most basic) leg of Professor Choper's argument, the claim
22. This seems to be the force underlying a passionate and provocative
(though sketchy) recent article by Philip Bobbitt, engagingly entitled Constitutional
Fate. Bobbitt concludes: "Our constitutional fate is determined by the arguments by
which the Constitution structures decision; yet we determine their availability by our
choice of constitutional functions. The framers could do no more for us than bequeath
us such decisions, within such conventions. In our theories, therefore, are our fates."
Bobbitt, ConstitutionalFate, 58 TEX. L. REV. 695, 775 (1980).
23. Much jurisprudential discourse is made unnecessarily obscure by analyses
which confuse instrumental ends and ends-in-themselves. Institutional procedures may
be designed to further ends which are themselves inherently normatively worthy (like
Kant's categorical imperatives). These I call ends-in-themselves because they provide a
self-contained source of theoretical justification. For utilitarians, the maximization of
aggregate utility would be such an end-in-itself. Other ends of the political process may
be only way-stations in the process of normative justification. These, which I call instrumental ends (and which are akin to Kant's hypothetical imperatives), are
themselves legitimate because they are thought to further, or stand in for, or approximate, or maximize, other legitimate ends. For a utilitarian, the market may be an instrumental end, since it is thought to further the end-in-itself of utility maximization.
Instrumental ends are, therefore, actually means to the accomplishment of
other, more deeply embedded ends. But because they often come to stand as surrogates for the ends that they serve, we too frequently elide the two together and
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that judicial review is faulty because it is antidemocratic. Certainly,
judicial review is antimajoritarian." But, we must ask, so what? For
view instrumental ends to be as strong a source of justificatory force as we do ends-inthemselves. Thus, the market may come to be viewed not as an instrument or means
to the achievement of the self-validating end of maximized utility, but as an
autonomous source of legitimacy. Similarly, I suggest here that democracy, which we
commonly view as an independent source of legitimacy, is actually only a process, a
means, an instrumental end legitimated by the fact that it often furthers individual
autonomy.
The distinction is more than one of mere form. Instrumental ends are susceptible to many types of criticism to which ends-in-themselves are not. Thus, we may
claim that an instrumental end is unacceptable because it is inefficient, it fails, that is,
adequately to foster the norm that lends it justification. That sort of claim, however,
would be meaningless if we were discussing an end-in-itself, since efficiency by definition is a measurement against an external criterion. Thus, ends-in-themselves are normative cul-de-sacs, cutting off argument by the force of their authority. We can,
therefore, even if we are utilitarians at heart, criticize the marketplace because it does
not perfectly maximize our ultimate value of utility. But we cannot entertain
arguments that suggest that the maximization of utility is somehow not effective, since
it is the fundamental norm on which we base our judgments. At worst, it can only be
balanced against other, similarly basic ends.
We run into difficulty when we elide an instrumental end into an end-in-itself
because in so doing we change the nature of the arguments that we will admit into our
discourse. If, after years of relying on an instrumental end as a surrogate for an endin-itself, we come to believe that the former actually has itself taken on the autonomy
of the latter, we will reject much criticism that should be viewed as valid. If, that is,
we come to view democracy as an end, rather than as a means to the end of the maximization of individual autonomy, then we will not be swayed by a demonstration that
there are circumstances in which democracy actually thwarts autonomy. We will have
subordinated the import of a fundamental value to that of its handservant. If, conversely, we come to view autonomy as simply an instrumental end, then we will improperly be willing to listen to arguments which seek to demonstrate that it is inefficient or impractical. Choper does both. He views democracy as an end-in-itself, flatly
castigating judicial review because it is antimajoritarian. And he views autonomy as
an instrumental end, strongly affirming individual rights, but nevertheless repeatedly
subjecting them to pragmatic arguments which would be out of place if they were
deemed to be ends-in-themselves. For a discussion of democracy and participative
government respectively as, in effect, instrumental ends and ends-in-themselves, see
Waggoner, Log-Rolling and JudicialReview, 52 U. COLO. L. REV. 33, 34-35 (1980).
The distinction discussed in this footnote, though in some senses quite traditional (see, e.g., C. FRIED, ANATOMY OF VALUES 27-39, 112-15 (1970); Developments in
the Law-Conflicts of Interest in the Legal Profession, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1244, 1252-60
(1981)), may be more facile than the subject warrants. For a more detailed analysis of
the issue in a related context (moral discourse), see P. FOOT, VIRTUES & VICES AND
OTHER ESSAYS IN MORAL PHILOSOPHY 157-73 (1980).
24. I use the terms "antidemocratic" and "antimajoritarian" interchangeably
in this essay, even though they may be clearly distinguished in other contexts. It is
easy, and by and large harmless, to lose sight in general argument of the ways in
which democracy, majoritarianism, and representative government are both similar
and different. It is important, however, to keep all of these concepts, which are instrumental ends-political processes which are not necessarily inherently selfvalidating- distinct from the end-in-itself that they serve. The thrust of this section of
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one thing, Choper's discussion of the executive branch is almost exclusively limited to direct actions of the President, 5 and the Court
does seem less politically responsive than an elected chief executive.
Yet the vast federal administrative machine, fueled by tenured civil
servants and maintained by appointed overseers, is in many ways
both a more influential and a more pervasive component of the executive branch than the President himself. And this bureaucracy
seems to be neither very flexible nor terribly amenable to direct
majoritarian influence.2"
Furthermore, in spite of the dangers that we are asked suddenly
to note, the Court has in fact not succumbed, and indeed has often
appeared to be more stable than either the legislature or the executive. Indeed, it has often been the instrument for the legitimation (through law) of actions taken by the other branches. Antimajoritarian or not, it seems to workY
But these are minor quibbles; they are not indicative of the
the text is an attempt to demonstrate that Choper mistakenly seems to believe that
any or all of these instrumental ends are self-legitimating. My colleague Paul Cox
seeks to demonstrate that John Ely, in effect, does the same thing by subordinating
judicial review to majoritarianism. Cox, Book Review, 15 VAL. U. L. REV. 637, 644-47,
661-64 (1981).
There is certainly solid foundation in Ely's text for Professor Cox's reading. J.
ELY, supra note 14, at 55, 82, 89. Cox views Ely as torn between the inherent value of
democracy and his distrust of elective political process as a means of expressing the
collective substantive will.
I tend to view Ely's theory as less internally conflicted, though I readily admit
that in doing so I ignore some of the plain meaning of his text. The fact that he
distrusts democratic process when it fails to provide representation for some minority
of citizens, thereby elevating access to government process to a higher level of normative importance than he accords majoritarian decision-making itself, suggests very
strongly that he views democracy as an instrumental end serving some higher, unarticulated end-in-itself. Thus, precisely because Ely is less concerned about whether a
majority actually backs any particular policy than he is about whether all citizens have
been permitted to participate in the process generating the policy, we must assume
that there is a coherent normative principle in which Ely believes and which generates
both his taste for democracy and his distrust of democratic political process. As Professor Cox notes, supra note 24, at 644, that underlying principle appears to be an
adoption of Ronald Dworkin's notion of "equal concern and respect," particularly as it
applies to political process. J. ELY, supra note 14, at 82; R. DWORKIN, supra note 4, at
180.
25. J. CHOPER, supra note 1, at 46-47.
26. Paul Cox argues that the antimajoritarian nature of federal bureaucracy
should cause the Court to be most careful about deferring to executive assessments of
the will of the majority. Cox, supra note 24, at 650-53.
27. Much of the history of attempted incursions into the Court's power,
history that Choper himself presents, strongly suggests its ability to withstand even
extreme political hostility. See, e.g., J. CHOPER, supra note 1, at 47-55.

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1981

Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 15, No. 3 [1981], Art. 5

612

VALPARAISO UNIVERSITYLAWREVIEW

[Vol. 15

book's crucial lack of an articulated theoretical base. It is far more
devastating that Choper never asks why we should view democratic
process as a fundamental political virtue.28 In some ways, that
failure is understandable -thinking such thoughts runs counter to
everything most holy about our political self-image. But, even
though it forces us to look behind the assumptions that have been
instilled in us since elementary school civics class, the question
bears close scrutiny: Is democracy an end-in-itself? 9
The inquiry is important to an assessment of Choper's work
because if democracy is not per se desirable, if sensitivity to the will
of the majority is not the prime directive of American government,
then Choper's entire first chapter, on which virtually all of his remaining argument is based, must topple. If, conversely, democratic
theory does drive American government, we are forced to wonder
what we are doing with a Constitution in the first place.
Constitutions are not amenable to the will of the majority.
Although our document may have been indirectly ratified at one
time (by a group of states whose voters did not include blacks,
women, native Americans, or the poor), it hardly derives its current
authority from the historical accident of that somewhat embarassing
electoral pedigree.' The Constitution itself is profoundly antimajoritarian, and not merely in its Bill of Rights. It is theoretically
antidemocratic", because its very existence reflects an insistence on
the part of the Framers that the legitimacy of government lies not
in mob acquiescence but in fundamental principles, in rights, in
precepts that cannot justifiably be violated even by a unanimous
citizenry. This is the theory that underlies the Declaration of Independence, a theory based in natural law every bit as deeply as,
though in direct opposition to, the divine right of kings. This is the
theory that breathes majesty into John Marshall's consummately
wise recognition that "we must never forget that it is a constitution
we are expounding.8 2
28. Professor Choper seems to feel that it is an absolute value, an end-initself. Id. at 10-11.
29. See Waggoner, supra note 23, at 34.
30. It seems to me that the frequently-espoused belief that governments
derive their authority from the consent of the governed (an assumption written into
the Declaration of Independence) may well be too strong. If individual autonomy is absolute, then no government can ever be acceptable. We must draw the line between
permissible government encroachments on individual liberty and impermissible ones.
Where we draw that line is, at the very least, controversial. See note 49 infra.
31. But see J. ELY, supra note 14, at 49, 89-90.
32. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407 (1819).
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Choper's claim of the primacy of democratic process proves
both too much and too little. It proves too much because if taken to
an extreme it argues that the Constitution itself, or at least the
overwhelming preponderance of it which does not sound in individual rights, should be voided because it violates the fundamental
value of majoritarian government. It proves too little because if the
argument is to be dropped short of that extreme, it fails to provide
a principled basis for doing so.
At base, the most significant aspect of constitutional government is its theoretical force. Other countries get along perfectly well
without constitutions. They protect the rights of their citizens,
through common law and legislation, at least as scrupulously as we
do. But we are in some sense conceptually enriched because our
charter, by its very existence as well as in its terms, assures us that
the foundation of our polity inheres in a set of principles on which
we can rely for authority and legitimacy.
If, therefore, the Constitution is itself antimajoritarian, then it
makes remarkable sense that the branch of government responsible
for ultimate constitutional interpretation should similarly be
separate from the democratic process." Thus, if Professor Choper
wishes to argue that democracy is a self-validating end-in-itself, he
should do so and seek to convince such hardcore skeptics as I of the
virtues of mob rule. If, as is likelier, he views it as something less,
then he must articulate a coherent theory in which democratic process plays a part, and he must demonstrate how the role it plays is
explicitly in conflict with the notion of judicial review.'
THE SUPREMACY OF INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS

It becomes evident that democracy qua democracy is not Professor Choper's fundamental value, since his second chapter is
devoted to an extended discussion of the importance of individual
rights. He sees these, quite evidently, as trumps,m but it is far from
clear why. He argues pragmatically that individual rights will not in
fact be protected by any majoritarian government, since the will of
the many is often likely to overwhelm the rights of the individual. 6
33. Bobbitt, supra note 22, at 754.
34. Ely, unlike Choper, does a first-rate job of articulating a coherent political
theory. J. ELY, supra note 14. As suggested in note 24 supra,Paul Cox feels that Ely's
theory embodies a conflict between judicial review and democratic process, while I
believe that he espouses an autonomy claim in which each plays a legitimate role.
35. See R. DWORKIN, supra note 4, at 188-92.
-6.
J. CHOPER, supra note 1, at 64-65.

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1981

Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 15, No. 3 [1981], Art. 5
614

VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol.15

And so he insists that the Court must be free to address conflicts of
this sort precisely because its tie to majority will is so severely attenuatedY
But why should we wish to protect individual rights? Certainly
it is not simply because they are guaranteed by the Constitution.
The core of that document as originally ratified was virtually silent
as to individual rights. Three years later the Bill of Rights added a
number of protections, but these were limited protections against
federal incursion into specified individual rights. Seventy-seven
years after that, the fourteenth amendment extended the reach of
those limited constitutional protections to actions taken by states.
The vast bulk of the material contained in the Constitution, even to
this day, deals with the allocation of institutional rights, both between the national authority and the states and among the three
branches of the federal government.' So, if Choper were arguing
that individual rights need not yield to majoritarian pressures simply
because those rights are part of the antidemocratic principles embodied by the Constitution, then he has neither shown that they are
central to that document, nor demonstrated that the other important institutional principles which are in fact basic to it should not
be accorded, as a matter of constitutional theory, similar protection.
It may be true, as Professor Choper seeks to show, that for
political reasons it is less likely that, for example, the Congress will
violate constitutional principles of federalism than that it will
violate individual rights. 9 Likelihood, however, is a concept borrowed from statistics. It may be relevant in policy arguments that
seek to select among various permitted options, but it has no place
in arguments of principle about acts that are normatively mandatory
or proscribed. It is not sufficient answer to a hypothesized violation
of principle that such acts are improbable, or that the Court would
be ineffective to stop them. If the theory on which our political institutions, including the Supreme Court, are founded has any meaning at all it is that whether violations of fundamental principles are
likely or not, whether the Court's intervention is efficient or not, the
Court has a duty to hear and decide such cases.
In denying that duty with respect to some cases, but asserting
it with respect to the protection of individual rights, Professor
37. Id at 64-70.
38. This observation is similar to Ely's that the Constitution deals almost
solely in procedural rights. J. ELY, supra note 14, at 88-101; see note 15 supra; note 46
infra.

39.

J. CHOPER, supra note 1, at 171-90.
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Choper therefore implicitly breaks rather daring theoretical ground.
He seems to be asserting that, although the legitimacy of the Constitution is by and large based on its adoption of democratic principles, there exist some rights (which, coincidentally, happen also to
be mentioned in the Constitution) that are so fundamental that they
displace even majoritarianism as an institutional value. These rights
are never clearly identified, nor are we given any basis for determining their content on our own. Moreover it is odd, if not bizarre,
that a professor of constitutional law and the author of a number of
treatises and texts in the area," should be making this sort of claim.
For it is a claim that essentially sounds in a common law reliance on
natural principles of justice, a claim that directly controverts the
value and import of, or for that matter the need for, a constitution.
It is possible, of course, that Professor Choper does not mean
to make this claim at all. It is possible that he in fact accepts the
fundamental import of the Constitution as a source of legal authority, and that his arguments are all meant to be pragmatic. He may
simply be seeking the best way to implement the constitutionally
expressed values of our political system, and his arguments may be
read as demonstrations that the Court is not suited to certain types
of political involvement. If so, then his plainly theoretical opening
chapter about the Court's antidemocratic nature is puzzling in its irrelevance.
More importantly, he never asks whether there are any questions that the Court has a duty to address, even when it cannot do
so efficiently." If we accept the Constitution as a source of normative political values that take precedence over political process,
do we not all, including the justices of the Supreme Court, owe it an
allegiance that prohibits us from sitting silently by while it is
violated before out eyes. So we must ask how it would be possible
for the Court, for pragmatic rather than theoretical reasons, voluntarily to refuse jurisdiction over cases that allege unconstitutional
action.
THE DAINTINESS OF JUDICIAL AUTHORITY

The desire to show some positive institutional harm caused by
judicial review may be the impetus for Professor Choper's third maIn addition to writing the volume under review, he is an author of W.
Y. KAMISAR, AND J. CHOPER. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: CASES, COMMENTS, AND
QUESTIONS (5th ed., 1980); W. LOCKHART, Y. KAMISAR, AND J. CHOPER. THE AMERICAN
CONSTITUTION: CASES AND MATERIALS (5th ed., 1980).
41. See, e.g., the discussion of the futility of judicial action in J. CHOPER,
supra note 1, at 222, 323.
40.

LOCKHART,
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jor argument-that the Court's authority is fragile and should be
husbanded in order to retain its maximum effectiveness with
respect to the all-important decisions concerning individual rights.'2
For this argument to work, however, he must include in it two
critical steps, two steps which he unfortunately does not even mention. First, as just noted, he must show why, as a matter of political
theory, it is permissible to sacrifice some constitutional cases as nonjusticiable. Second, he must show that, by sacrificing such cases in
practice, desirable theoretical ends are met in fact. There is a striking circularity to the way in which these are implicitly addressed by
Professor Choper. His theoretical argument seems to be that other
mechanisms will do at least a tolerable job of protecting the institutional principles of the Constitution," but that only the Court can
uphold the rights of individuals." So the Court must be sheltered
from as much criticism as possible if individual rights are to be afforded any protection. He then details an extensive catalogue of
cases, almost all of which involve either individual rights or the invalidation of unconstitutional state laws (both of which he argues
should be justiciable), cases which have collectively weakened the
Court's popular support." Since antimajoritarian activity undermines its popularity, such activity should be minimized, and since
the Court cannot give up its jurisdiction over individual rights,
everything else should be sacrificed.
In short, this argument insists that we accept that individual
rights cases are theoretically distinguishable from institutional
rights cases, so that it is permissible to sacrifice the latter to benefit
the former. It also requires us to view them as pragmatically indistinguishable, so that it does not matter that Choper's examples
demonstrating the weakening of the Court are almost all of the sort
over which he would have the Court retain jurisdiction.
In fact, we have reason to wonder whether either of these
claims is valid. Why, for example, would we wish to distinguish institutional rights from individual ones? Perhaps because the
underlying normative philosophy on which we premise the
legitimacy of our political system itself distinguishes persons from
things. Perhaps, that is, we accept an autonomy-based theory of individual rights, and therefore accord them a special political priority.
42.
43.
44.
45.

Id. 129-70.
See id. at 176-90.
Id. at 64-65.
See id. at 146-50.
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So persons would have rights that take precedence over any that an
institution such as a state or a branch of the federal government
might assert. I find this sort of argument generally to be quite appealing, but it would be naive to believe that this ordering of normative priorities alone provides a basis for distinguishing between
jndividual and institutional constitutional claims.
Here again the reason lies in the fact that the Constitution
itself is almost entirely devoted to the sort of claims that I have
been facilely labeling "institutional." If that foundational document
in fact is primarily concerned with such matters and is unconcerned
about the protection of individual rights, that would appear to argue
that our system, for better or worse, does not accept the sort of
ethical premise of personal autonomy that I have just suggested it
does.
Alternatively, perhaps institutional rights are actually a
specialized form of individual right." Perhaps they are therefore not
theoretically distinguishable from other rights based on personal
autonomy. We should note that the Constitution, even including the
Bill of Rights and the fourteenth amendment, does not reach individual rights in any absolute fashion. It is, after all, a political
document, and it protects individual rights only as those lie against
institutional actions.47 Interpersonal clashes of personal rights are
beyond the scope of the document. If we understand the Constitution to set out the rights of the individual as against the power of
the state, then it becomes plausible that individual rights will in46. Interestingly, although Professor Ely's constitutional theory, unlike Professor Choper's, is process-based, he fails to discuss the question of institutional,
rather than individual, procedural rights. Insofar as my argument will suggest that an
institutional right is merely a specialized individual right to government process, I see
no reason why anything in his argument would contradict my claim that the Court
should take cognizance of these rights as well.
47. This is the distinction that I believe Professor Ely means to make when
he argues that the Constitution yields procedural, rather than substantive, rights. J.
Ely, supra note 14 at 75-101. It is a deceptive distinction, and one that Paul Cox feels
is untenable in practice. Cox, supra note 24, at 663 n.127. My own sense is that Ely is
simply articulating the fact that the substance of government is procedure. Thus, the
substantive content of a document creating a government will necessarily be concerned with the procedures that define the institutions constituting the government
itself. And when we seek to infuse expanded meaning into the open-ended terms of
such a document, the values that we must rely on are those values that breathe life into
our political theory. In this sense, then, all constitutional interpretation is procedural;
it is concerned with the ways in which government processes impinge on individual
autonomy, not with the independent substantive norms that are the subject of moral
philosophy. J. ELY, supra note 14, at 48-54, 89-90.

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1981

Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 15, No. 3 [1981], Art. 5
618

VALPARAISO UNIVERSITYLAWREVIEW

[Vol. 15

elude certain claims of process. The most fundamental of these is a
right to know the law, a right to a stable political process embodied
in a coherent social contract. I am suggesting that there may be a
fundamental political claim to the form of government embraced by
and articulated in the Constitution, 8 and that each one of us has the
absolute right to insist, in literally every political forum, that the.
social contract be enforced. The legitimacy of constitutional government, then, would rely not on its sensitivity to the will of the majority, but on the basic propriety of a set of norms which can only
be modified by the sort of overwhelming consensus necessary to set
in motion the creaky and cranky machinery of constitutional revision. 9
Institutional rights, then, are in fact personal ones, and at least
historically they were construed as such by the citizenry. The con48. This claim is not content-specific. That is, we have a formal right to insist
on the government articulated in the Constitution, independent of the content of that
articulation. There may also be a content-specific right. Text accompanying note 84, infra.
49. It is fair to asert that these claims may sound in the autonomy of individuals because claims about the basic legitimacy of government may be viewed as
claims about the legitimacy of the state's power to intervene in individual lives. It is
common to ask how any government not directly consented to by those it govens can
assert the right to impinge on the autonomy of its citizens. I am suggesting that the
availability of certain fundamental institutional rights, including the right to rely on
continuity in form of government, may serve the same legitimating role that active assent does. My notion here is that certain very basic rights to political procedure
(rather like those implicitly suggested by Lon Fuller) have a fundamental importance
that derives from their ability to legitimate the rest of the government's substantive
and procedural political theory. See L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAw 39 (2d ed. 1969).
Alan Goldman makes the argument that judges have a special obligation to obey the
law in order to provide precisely this sort of stability and consistency within the social
contract. Goldman, The Obligation to Obey Law, 6 Soc. THEORY & PRAC. 13, 17 (1980).
He does not, however, seem to feel that such stability is itself sufficient legitimation of
a political structure. Id. at 22-23. Whether or not it constitutes a sufficient justification
for a particular government, it does appear to be at least a necessary condition for
legitimacy. How likely is it that we would initially consent to enter into an agreement
whose terms could be changed whenever an institution created by the agreement
deemed it wise to change them? Even if that institution represented the will of a majority of the participants, would we not demand that any changes in the fundamental
agreement must require something much closer to unanimity precisely belcause we feel
that government requires the continuing consent of the governed? Thus, even if one
accepts the more traditional notion of consensual government (which is a substantially
stronger requirement than the one I suggest above) it seems likely that we will insist
upon a consistent interpretation and implementation of the procedures of government
laid out in our Constitution, an interpretation and implementation, that is, which is not
subject to legislative whim.
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troversy provoked by !ases such as McCulloch v. Maryland," Martin
v. Hunter's Lessee,51 Cohens v. Virginia," Chisolm v. Georgia,' and
the Cherokee Nation Cases" gives some inkling of the visceral
nature of the early development of these rights. For a more contemporary barometer of the extent to which we feel a personal stake in
the outcome of such litigation, we need only examine our own
response to the Watergate litigation and, less recently, the Steel
Seizure Case."6
If my view of the basis in personal autonomy of those constitutional rights generally thought to be institutional is correct, then, as
should become evident, much of the remainder of Choper's argument
comes undone. Even if I am wrong, however, and Professor Choper
relies on an unstated constitutional theory that affirms his distinction between personal and institutional rights,57 there remains the
second, pragmatic hurdle which his argument must leap. Is it really
true that decision-making in the cases that he would have the Court
eschew contributes significantly to a diminution of the Court's influence and strength?
Several questions demand answer here: Is the national
Supreme Court more fragile with respect to federal separation of
power questions than the state supreme courts are with respect to
parallel state cases? If not, then we may observe not one, but fiftyone institutions that have accepted the burden of addressing these
sorts of questions and have survived essentially unscathed. Second,
we must wonder whether the particularcases that Professor Choper
would have the Court refuse have in fact contributed to the fragility
that he documents. If so, would it not have been wise for him to in-

50. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
51. 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816).
52. 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821).
53. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793).
54. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832); Cherokee Nation v.
Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831).
55. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
56. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
57. Professor Choper seeks to articulate a principled distinction between individual and institutional rights. J. CHOPER. supra note 1, at 201-03. I am simply not
convinced by his flat assertion that the Constitution's allocations of institutional
powers function solely to regulate traffic and create a workable government. A constitution hardly seems necessary to serve these ends, which could as easily be addressed
through legislation or common law. I am similarly skeptical about his flat claim that
individual citizens have no interest in the assertion and protection of states' rights. Id.
at 203-05.
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elude a substantial number of such cases among the examples he
provides? In fact, he offers virtually no such documentation. Instead,
he shows that individuals fail to obey the Court's rights-based
decision-making and that they are angered by those decisions and by
ones in which the Court overturns the constitutional interpretation
of state officials." But these are cases that Choper would have the
Court hear.
Suppose, however, that it is true that decision-making in the
hard cases that Choper would make nonjusticiable in fact contributes to popular hostility toward the Court. He never shows why
it is reasonable to believe that the avoidance of such decisionmaking would be any less dangerous to the Court's credibility. Is it
not plausible that, if he is correct that these cases have nothing to
do with individual rights, they will have very little impact, one way
or the other, on the electorate? Perhaps, in a purely functional argument of the sort Choper favors, the fact that the litigants in such
cases as these are political institutions, not persons, will make them
more responsive to the Court's determinations than the unruly
populace that must respond to the Court's rights-based decisionmaking. 9 Furthermore, Professor Choper fails to demonstrate that
unpopularity is, in practice, dangerous to the Court's mission. It
seems likely that, since in every judicial case there is a loser, and in
every case of Supreme Court dimension there will likely be an entire class of losers, general low-level hostility to the Court's
decision-making will constantly grow." But it is not clear that this
social hostility varies directly with the number of cases actually
decided, or that some of it can be avoided by simply avoiding
jurisdiction. Nor is it clear that this decentralized hostility has any
tendency to coalesce into a significant political opposition to the
Court, an opposition composed of parties whose interests are otherwise disparate."'
58. Id at 146-50.
59. The only empirical examples Professor Choper presents have to do with
the response of citizens, not governments, to judicial action. Id. at 146-50.
Indeed a strong argument can be made that institutional litigants will be less
obstreporous than human ones because they have a stronger ethical duty to obey the
Court than do mere citizens. See Goldman, supra note 49, at 13.
60. Id.at 156.
61. Professor Choper seeks to make this argument by fiat, bolstered by the
unconvincing example of a supposed coalition between opponents of the Court's school
prayer decision and its school desegregation decisions. Id. at 158-60. The missing link
is the failure to demonstrate that the opponents of these issues were in fact meaningfully distinct groups even prior to the Court's actions.
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Finally, one must wonder whether dodging jurisdiction would
not in fact generate still greater hostility than decision-making
does. " Certainly almost all losers whose cases are so meritorious
that they gain review by the Supreme Court will feel that they have
been cheated when the Court holds for the other side. But it is only
human nature that, if the federal judiciary abstains from deciding an
entire class of cases, all of the would-be litigants will feel cheated.
Each will believe itself to be a probable winner, and each will feel
robbed of a favorable outcome. Thus, if the Court hears a case, one
party will likely be disaffected. But if it holds that same case to be
nonjusticiable it may well have added two aggrieved parties to the
ranks of its opponents.
THE ASYMMETRICAL HERMENEUTICS OF CHOPER'S FEDERALISM

Professor Choper, then, has far to go if he is to be able to maintain his fragility claim even on pragmatic grounds. To provide
theoretical justification he must go further still. Perhaps, however,
these are merely lapses in his argument, not fallacies. Clearly, I lack
the necessary jurisprudential predisposition to do him justice when
I seek to articulate the way in which he might try to defend these
claims. Nevertheless, in examining his next claim, the "Federalism
Proposal," the weaknesses already outlined return with a
vengeance. And, as before, even if we ignore these recurring problems, new and independent difficulties arise.
The Federalism Proposal is the notion that the Court should
stay asymmetrically clear of federalism questions. That is, it should
declare nonjusticiable those cases in which it is alleged that a piece
of federal legislation is an unconstitutional incursion on states'
rights 8 even though it should continue to hear cases in which it is
alleged that a state has encroached on federal constitutional
prerogatives." This has significant fragility problems, as noted
above. If public attitudes toward the Court are indeed undermined
by some of its decision-making, does the Federalism Proposal really
afford any sanctuary? Specifically, even if we limit ourselves to the
two sorts of cases it addresses, what benefit does it provide?
Perhaps the most revealing example is one that Choper himself
suggests, Jefferson's highly critical response to McCulloch v.
62. Professor Choper asserts, without demonstration, that this is not the case.
Id. at 169-70.
63. Id. at 175-76.
64. Id. at 205-11.
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Maryland." What would have happened if the Court had not acted?
As a preliminary matter, we should note that McCulloch appears to
have been justiciable even under the Federalism Proposal, since it
sought to invalidate a state law that infringed on a federal institution." Thus, once again, Choper relies for his fragility argument on
the hue and cry generated by a case that he would permit the Court
to have heard.
There were, however, two issues in McCulloch, and the
Federalism Proposal would distinguish between them. The first was
whether the Congress had the right to create a federal bank, the second whether Maryland had the right to tax it. The first would not
be justiciable, the second would. Let us assume that the Court ruled
as Choper would have wished. It would not have found the first
question to be judicially cognizable. But that would most certainly
not have prevented it from reaching the second, and far more controversial, one. Under Choper's plan the Court would have yielded
to Congress with respect to the constitutional interpretation of the
limits of its authority, and it would therefore have assumed the
Bank to be constitutional as a tautological matter of statutory interpretation-if Congress enacted the statute, its content must by
definition be constitutional. 7 Believing the power to tax to involve
the power to destroy, it would then necessarily have reached
precisely the same result, in precisely the same forum, as was in
fact reached in McCulloch. And it seems likely that the resulting
outcry would have been every bit as great." Quite simply, it is dif65. "The Court's act of legitimation provoked Jefferson's famous characterization of the Justices as 'the subtle corps of sappers and miners constantly working
underground to undermine the foundations of our confederated fabric."' Id at 231.
(quoting 1 C. WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN HISTORY 546 (1932)).
66. This is but one of several examples of Choper's appeal to an example that
does not fit his argument. Perhaps the most striking instance is a list of two executive,
one military, and one Congressional action which are then lumped together and
described as "majority-sponsored activities." J. CHOPER, supra note 1, at 142-43.
67. This irrebuttable presumption of congressional authority to interpret the
Constitution is stronger than the standard rebuttable presumption of the constitutionality of legislative action. It is precisely this small but significant added procedural
twist that generates the problems described in the text.
68. Choper seems primarily to be nervous about the fact that the hostility
generated by its decision was directed at the Court, even though it was Congress' act
that was upheld. J. CHOPER, supra note 1, at 142-43. He may well be correct that at
least some of its more sophisticated critics would have aimed their political barbs at
the legislature rather than the Court if the Federalism Proposal had been followed.
But we must wonder how many critics would in fact have been that sophisticated and,
more importantly, whether their ire would work more violence to the system as a
whole if it were channeled into political fury at an unbridled Congress rather than into
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ficult to understand precisely how the fragility argument cuts when
applied to the kinds of cases captured by the Federalism Proposal.
We will again want to know more than Professor Choper tells
us about his jurisprudential assumptions if we are to accept the
Federalism Proposal. This is the chapter in which he most explicitly
presupposes that institutional rights are not grounded in individual
liberties. Rather, he seems to believe that institutional rights are
mere housekeeping concerns, in which individuals should really have
no interest. His apparent message is, let the various governments
slug it out among themselves. Why should we get involved? I have
suggested at least one reason-that institutional rights are formed
out of individual rights-why I think we, as individuals, are involved, involved as a matter of fundamental political legitimacy. For
Professor Choper's perspective to be the correct one, I would want
to have an alternative theory that provided both a source of government authority and an understanding of the theoretical role played
by the body of our Constitution.
These questions begin to take on the well-worn quality of a
catechism. The Federalism Proposal, however, also raises new
issues. In particular it requires a theoretical understanding of the
nature of doctrinal interpretation, an understanding that legitimates
two parallel, entirely separate hermeneutic paths with respect to a
single body of law. Interpretation of the powers of the Congress or
the President with respect to the states is to be left to those branches. But interpretation of the power of the states with respect to
the federal government is left to the Court. This might be plausible,
if seemingly out of balance, were it not for the fact that all of those
powers are often inseparably interdependent.
A pair of hypothetical fact patterns suggested by McCulloch
may dramatize this point: Let us assume that Congress creates a
federal bank and locates one of its branches in Maryland. Maryland,
it turns out, has a previously-enacted moderate tax on banks located
within its borders, and it seeks to collect payment from the federal
bank. The federal bank refuses, arguing that, since the power to tax
is the power to destroy, Maryland's actions at least implicitly impermissibly impinge on Congressional prerogatives. Maryland responds
by acknowledging that the power to tax may become the power to
destroy, but argues that the two are distinguishable and that it may
exercise the former without asserting the latter. No one raises the
intellectual frustration over the Court's reasoning process. I make this point somewhat
more strongly in the final paragraph of this essay.
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question whether Congress had the authority to create the bank in
the first place.
Let us suppose, further, that the case reaches the Supreme
Court, and that that body must address the issue whether Maryland
can tax a congressionally-created bank. Congress has been silent on
the question, though the Solicitor General argues that Maryland's
action is constitutionally impermissible. The Court, under the
Federalism Proposal, would find the question to be justiciable. It
holds that Maryland may constitutionally impose such a tax. 9
Congress, incensed, acts. It passes a law prohibiting imposition
of any state tax on any federal bank. Maryland, in its state courts,
deems the new congressional act to be unconstitutional. The case
reaches the Supreme Court again. In this instance the Court is faced
with the constitutional doctrine it has developed, on the one hand,
and that developed by the Congress, on the other." Separate
strands of constitutional authority have been permitted to develop,
and Maryland justly feels that its conceptual position is strongly
bolstered by the Court's original acquiescence in it. Congress' act
appears to be a mere power play, not a reasoned constitutional judgment.
But, Choper argues, the Court must defer to Congress's will.
Actually, that is only part of what he argues. The Federalism Proposal asserts: "the constitutional issue of whether federal action is
69. This is not inconsistent with what the Court actually held in McCulloch. It
suggested that other forms of state tax might validly be applied to the federal bank. 4
U.S. (4 Wheat) 436-37 (1819).
70. A situation very similar to this existed in postwar Italy, where two
separate courts had distinct, ultimate interpretive authority. One was responsible for
interpreting the Italian constitution, the other for interpreting the common law.
Because it was impossible to maintain totally separate doctrinal strands, intense conflicts emerged between the two courts, conflicts that could not be resolved within the
Italian legal system. See Merryman and Vigoriti, When Courts Collide: Constitution
and Cassation in Italy, 15 AM. J. OF COMP. L. 665 (1967).
In a recent article Lawrence Sager suggests an interesting distinction that
would complicate the hypothetical still further: he argues that the balance of judicial
versus congressional authority shifts as between a case in which the Supreme Court
holds state practices to be constitutionally infirm and a case in which it holds, absent
congressional action, that- a specific state action is constitutionally permissible. He
notes that, within the bounds of its constitutional powers, Congress may invalidate
state action of the latter type, and the Court will thereafter be bound to enforce this
new piece of legislation. Sager, The Shortcut to Outlaw Abortion, N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS,
June 25, 1981, at 39, 40. As I read Sager's argument, the Court could invalidate such
congressional action if it deemed it to exceed congressional authority under the
enumerated powers. Id. at 41. Under Choper's Federalism Proposal, such a claim of
congressional overreaching would also be nonjusticiable.
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beyond the authority of the central government . . . should be
treated as nonjusticiable, final resolution being relegated to the
political branches-ie. Congress and the President.'71 Thus, in
vesting final interpretive authority in federal political branches,
Choper seems to feel that nonjusticiability-a lack of jurisdictional
power even to hear a case-is equivalent to federal supremacy-a
judicial holding, in a justiciable case, that another branch may
legitimately determine the scope of its own action. In fact, of course,
holding the issue (which here is the entire case) to be nonjusticiable
would simply throw the question back into the entire political arena,
which happens to include the internal political mechanism of the
state of Maryland. Alternatively, the Court could recognize congressional or presidential supremacy. But doing so would reveal an inexplicable tenet of underlying constitutional theory: we are asked to
believe that the document has no coherent independant meaning,
but rather is simply an abstract armature around which the political
branches can sculpt whatever substantive law is currently in vogue
with their constituents.72
The Court, then, would have to take one of two actions under
the Federalism Proposal. First, it could accept jurisdiction, rule the
case justiciable and then rule, according to Choper's claim, that Congress' actions are per se constitutional. Under this approach, the
Court would view its initial judgment about the constitutionality of
Maryland's action to have been contingent-Maryland's tax was
constitutionally-valid only in the context of congressional silence.
Once Congress spoke, the matter became a simple question of
statutory enforcement, and the Court would be required to subordinate its prior reasoned interpretation of Maryland's rights to Congress' more recent (and more self-serving) political one. This seems
to be the result that Choper would require. 8
71. J. CHOPER. supra note 1, at 175 (emphasis added).
72. The dangers of this form of political shuffleboard are discussed in Sager,
supra note 70. It is possible, and recent events even suggest that it is likely, that
minorities of voters who are "passionate" on at least two distinct issues can
manipulate the representative political process in such a way that this approach to
constitutional interpretation is not even majoritarian. See Rogowski, Representation in
Political Theory and in Law, 91 ETHICs 395, 400 (1981), citing A. DOWNS, AN ECONOMIC
THEORY OF DEMOCRACY 55-60 (1957).
73. "In such decisions, unlike its constitutional rulings on individual liberties
and national power versus states' rights, the Court does not speak the final constitutional word. The federal political branches do." Id at 207. It is unclear what Professor
Choper means by.alluding to Supreme Court rulings on the constitutional balance between national power and states' rights. The Federalism Proposal seems explicitly to
permit Congress to preempt that sort of decision-making on the part of the Court by
allowing it to enact legislation that will then be deemed nonjusticiable. In addition, the
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The Court's other alternative would be to hold the issue to be
genuinely nonjusticiable. It would then have to decide whether, absent any conclusive constitutional interpretation, it was bound to enforce an extension of congressional power that its earlier doctrinal
interpretation had suggested was unconstitutional. If Choper were
urging genuine nonjusticiability, then, the Court would make no
judgment about the constitutionality of Congress' (or Maryland's) actions. Instead, it simply would refuse to hear those issues because
the rules of the game, once Congress has acted, do not grant it
7
discretion to do so. 4
Unfortunately, whether the Court rules or not, since it does not
presume to issue an authoritative constitutional judgment, Maryland
has its own enforcement mechanisms,"5 and the federal government
(in the form of the bank and in the person of its officers) is very
much present in Maryland. So the Federalism Proposal, by bifurcating doctrinal development and vesting final authority in the
political branches, serves only to exacerbate tensions and transfer
the locus of discussion from right to might.
passage quoted here seems to transform adjudication in which both the state and a
federal political branch have acted into a simple matter of statutory or administrative
interpretation on the Court's part. The only remaining cases in which the notion of a
Supreme Court constitutional ruling with respect to a clash between states' rights and
those of a federal political branch might have any meaning would be those in which the
state has acted and the federal branches have noL But if Professor Choper means that
these decisions are actual, final interpretations of the Constitution by the Court, then
subsequent Congressional action of the type described in the text could not be granted
the deference that the Federalism Proposal seems to require.
However this apparent internal conundrum is worked out, we are left with the
difficulty suggested in the text. The McCulloch example is substantially less unnatural
than it may initially seem. The current congressional attempt to circumvent Roe v.
Wade by reinterpreting the word "person" in the fourteenth amendment would, if it
succeeds and is accepted by the Court, create a very similar circumstance. Many of the
concerns expressed about the propriety of such congressional action ( see, e.g., Sager,
supra note 70) are equally applicable to the McCulloch-based hypothetical. (I recognize,
of course, that the abortion question sounds in individual rights and is therefore
justiciable even on Choper's terms. That distinction, however, does not appear to
mitigate the applicability of the kind of argument that Sager makes to questions that
sound only in institutional rights.)
74. Another area of dense undergrowth in the jungle of Professor Choper's
reasoning is the question whether his implicit constitutional theory defines his various
nonjusticiability proposals to be discretionary refusals of jurisdiction on the part of the
Court or rather to be mandatory theoretical limitations on its constitutional reach.
75. The actual events surrounding the bank ases (including the impounding
of federal reserves and the arrest of federal employees) is richly illustrative of the
point made by the hypothetical fact pattern. See'4 A. BEVERIDGE, THE LIFE OF JOHN
MARSHALL

323-30 (1919).
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Ultimately, then, these two hypothetical cases highlight the
central problems implicit in the Federalism Proposal as Choper
defines it. If the Proposal actually urges that the Court should not
decide the constitutionality of issues on which Congress or the
President has acted, but that it should decide the constitutionality
of issues on which the other federal branches are silent but on
which a state has acted, then two parallel lines of constitutional doctrine are encouraged. This will inevitably lead to a clash between
those parallel doctrines, a clash that, by definition, will lack the
reflective quality inherent in judicial decision-making."'
The other possibility, which is admittedly more faithful to Professor Choper's arguments,77 is that the Court should in fact decide
all federalism cases on their merits. Its decision-making, however, is
to be tempered by the understanding that only Congress and the
President can make an ultimate, authoritative constitutional interpretation. The Court takes on the quality of a fidgety go-between,
hoping that, when the other branches have been silent, its judicial
interpolation will not tread on legislative or executive toes. As soon
as one of the other branches speaks, even if it reads the Constitution differently from the way in which the Court had, the Court
must adapt its view to that of the majoritarian body and must enforce the new rule. In doing so it finds the question of the Constitution's reach to be justiciable, and holds that the answer to that question is to be found in, for example, congressional action. One must
wonder, then, why the Court should be involved at all. Would it not
be far better to leave the question entirely up to Congress and the
executive, allowing them to respond to state incursions directly?
State actions, under this approach, even when taken in the context
of congressional and presidential silence, are reviewable by those
branches and by state courts. Why should such state action be so
suspect that the Supreme Court must be called in to make contingent
decisions which, if they offend either the Congress or the President,
can always be legislatively or bureaucratically overturned by force
majeure?
Choper asserts, however, that his asymmetrical approach is actually a virtue, since the states are so plainly well-represented in
76. Waggoner, who has substantially greater faith in the value of legislati.
decision-making than I do, expresses similar reservations and suggests that judicial
deference to congressional action may perhaps be best justified by analogy to the doctrine of res judicata. That leaves open, of course, the question why the Court should
revise its own judgment when Congress acts only after a judicial decision has been
rendered. Waggoner, supra note 23, at 38.
77. Choper, supra note 1, at 175.
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the federal decision-making process," even though federal interests
are not represented in the states." Thus we should not be surprised
that individual states will occasionally misconstrue the Constitution
to further their own interests, but we will never expect the federal
government to intrude on the rights of the states of which is it composed. This has some initial appeal, but it still does not explicate
why, under Choper's scheme, the Supreme Court is the branch that
must be assigned to deal with the anticipated state encroachment on
federal prerogative. Why not simply leave this sort of determination
to Congress as well?
Furthermore, we must ask whether Professor Choper genuinely wishes us to believe that elected federal officials are better
barometers of state interests than their local counterparts.' If so,
one wonders why it is, for example, that Congress could pass with
apparent ease a piece of legislation that required every state to
adopt policies governing education of the handicapped which exceeded
those implemented by literally any of the states at the time the
federal law was passed.' Perhaps it could be argued that most
states were prevented from following their actual desires, out of
fear that they would become magnets for the families of the handicapped."2 Nevertheless, that argument seems particularly weak
when we observe how many states' welfare and medicaid programs
exceed the minimally acceptable federal level, even though I know
of no state in which, even five years after its passage, the educational benefits accorded the handicapped exceed those required by
federal law.
The claim that the states are represented so well in the federal
government that they will never find themselves constitutionally
mistreated by an act of Congress or of the President also flies in the
face of Choper's analysis of individual rights. Individuals are
represented in the federal government, arguably more directly than
the states are. Nevertheless, Professor Choper does not believe that
this in fact affords their rights any significant protection, and he
relies instead on the Court for shelter." Yet he believes that since
78. J. CHOPER, supra note 1, at 176-90.
79. Id. at 205-11.
80. Id. at 181-84.
81. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1401-61 (1976).
82. See J. CHOPER. supra note 1, at 184-85. This argument is similar to the
one frequently made concerning federal welfare legislation; it would explain why each
state might choose individually not to enact welfare legislation of its own, even when
there existed a clear national mandate for a welfare system.
83. M. at 64-65.
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the states are represented in the federal government they will
never be encroached upon." Perhaps he feels that federal legislators
place themselves in Rawls' original position85 when they make determinations that have an impact on the states (by assuming
themselves to represent the least well-off state), even though they
routinely refuse to place themselves in that position with respect to
their individual constituents. Or perhaps he simply feels that no one
really cares whether the federal government occasionally treads on
states' toes, a belief that presupposes that there can be no individual right to political process.
Indeed, Professor Choper explicitly, repeatedly, and quite improperly seeks to hold individual claims to due process to be irrelevant to his argument." He suggests that no individual right against
the state is implicated when a litigant claims that, for example, the
Congress has taken an action which the petitioner believes to be unconstitutional in Congress' hands but not in those of the states. He
points out that some government could permissibly take such action,
and he therefore seems to believe that which government actually
takes the action is unimportant. In his book any process is due pro87
cess.
84. Representation, at least of the sort that the states have in Congress, does
not necessarily assure that their interests will be fairly reflected in legislative enactments. Log-rolling, which is arguably a necessary and beneficial aspect of representative government (see Waggoner, supra note 23), can result in the unfair exclusion of
some states' interests. See Rogowski, supra note 72, at 399. Intrinsic, but unavoidable,
failures of representation (such as that discussed in note 72, supra) may yield additional inequities. Id at 400.
85. J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 11-17 (1971).
86. J. CHOPER, supra note 1, at 195-205, 272-73.
87. Professor Ely is highly critical of the notions of "substantive" and "procedural" due process, suggesting that the former is a contradiction in terms and the
latter a redundancy. In fact, though it is true that procedure is necessarily implied by
the "process" half of these phrases, it is a mistake to believe that that definitionally
excludes any reference to substance. The other half, the word "due," actually forces us
to examine the substance of the political rights in question. No one would argue
against the claim that different process is due with respect to different takings in different substantive contexts. To know what process is due in any set of circumstances,
then, requires an investigation into the substance of the asserted violation. When we
make such an investigation it is even conceivable that we will find some substantive
circumstances for which we cannot, in the current context, imagine any procedures extensive enough to legitimate the taking in question. Such circumstances would lead to
traditional notions of substantive due process. Whether such circumstances exist or
not, however, Professor Ely's claim is too strong. The phrase "substantive due
process" simply puts a meaningful emphasis on the due-ness of the process, while the
phrase "procedural due process" places the emphasis on formal questions of procedure.
By arguing that whatever actions can legitimately be taken by one instrumen-
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But is it? Can any legitimate governmental end be accomplished
by any conceivable governmental means without violating individual
rights? Not even Choper believes this to be the case, for he hauls
out a substantive due process argument in support of the judiciary's
right to review cases that involve conflicts with the other
branches." Individuals may have rights to some government processes. But, for Choper, they apparently have no right to the clear
articulation of a line between the power of the nation and that of
the states.
I wonder why not. I share the prejudice that the federal
government is far more sensitive to individual welfare rights than
are the states. So I, like many of rhy colleagues, agree to look the
other way when these are smuggled into government as federal
legislation rather than as a matter of right asserted on behalf of individual litigants in state or federal court. I would therefore be sympathetic to an argument that eliminated the role of the states. At
the same time, I am also sympathetic to the fears of those who
believe that small is beautiful and big is bad. Perhaps this caution
reflects an undue conservatism, but even paranoids occasionally
have geniune enemies, and I wonder whether the Framers were not
wise to dole out government power sparingly and with respect for
the proximity of government to the governed. In short, I wonder
whether my right to a clearly defined federalism-that is, my right
to claim that there are some things the states can fairly do to me
that the federal government cannot-is more than simply an assertion of a right to a stable social contract. Perhaps it also includes a
right to a decentralized polity. 9 If either is the case, and most particularly if the latter is, then Professor Choper is wrong to dodge
the argument that federalism is in fact Our Federalism-that it may
well sound in an assertion of individual rights not meaningfully
distinguishable from those for which he concedes the importance of
judicial review.
tality cannot as a matter of right be withheld from any other government instrumentality, Professor Choper seems to agree that the "due-ness" in "due process" is
surplusage adequately captured by "process" alone.
88. J. CHOPER, supra note 1, at 388-93.
89. Professor Choper does address this claim, though he asserts that it has
"no solid historical or logical basis." I& at 244, 244-58. Unfortunately, since he does not
consider the possibility that institutional rights may be rooted in individual ones, his
argument is substantially undermined. Furthermore, virtually all of his arguments
against the smaller-is-better claim (which is, after all, an end-in-itself) sound in history
or efficiency (which are relevant only to instrumental ends). The claim that decentralization of political power is a fundamental political right in our polity emerges from
his attack, therefore, virtually unscathed.
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THE ASYMMETRICAL HERMENEUTICS OF
CHOPER'S SEPARATION ARGUMENT

We may harbor many similar doubts with respect to Professor
Choper's "Separation Proposal" as well. This is the claim that the
Court should find all separation of powers cases involving a conflict
between the executive and the legislature to be nonjusticiable." It is
closely tied to the "Judicial Proposal," which asserts the Court's duty
to intercede in separation cases in which its own branch is implicated. Somewhere between the two proposals there lies an important group of cases in which the President and the Congress argue
about which has the authority to regulate the courts. But Choper experiences so much difficulty parsing out the differences between the
two types of cases he does address that we should probably be
relieved that he does not even try to deal with this third category.
I have suggested elsewhere that I believe separation of powers
cases of the kind that Choper would proscribe to lie at the very
heart of our judicial structure." It is not surprising, therefore, that I
find the Separation Proposal to be the least palatable portion of his
book. In particular, I would argue that one of the most important latent functions of the separation of powers is the way in which it accommodates the inherent conflict between twin desiderata: responsiveness to the will of the populace on the one hand and a desire for
a coherent (that is, simultaneously internally consistent and substantively complete) theory of government on the other. We are, I think,
equally concerned that our system be responsive to our wishes, that
it treat like cases alike, and that it provide some finite answer to all
questions of law. But these are internally incompatible. A particularly cogent demonstration of that fact is contained in Arrow's
Theorem, which proves that no system which is even minimally
responsive to the wishes of a diverse populace can necessarily be internally consistent.92 Thus we must accept either the wishes of some
"dictator" or the dictates of a legal system that is either inconsistent or incomplete. As a practical matter, the separation of powers
solves this problem by creating a complex hybrid dictator.93 Initial
questions of policy are broadly addressed by a highly representative
90. The Separation Proposal suffers from an
nonjusticiability with an irrebuttable presumption of
executive action. See, e.g., id. at 350.
91. Farago, Intractable Cases: The Role of
Law, 55 N.Y.U.L. REV. 195, 231 n.154, 238 (1980).
92. K. ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL
in Farago, supra note 91, at 229-31.
93. Id

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1981

occasional willingness to equate
the validity of congressional or
Uncertainty in the Concept of
VALUES

(2d ed. 1963), discussed

Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 15, No. 3 [1981], Art. 5

VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

632

[Vol.15

legislative branch. Questions of specific application, in which the
problem of internal inconsistency would be most likely to emerge,
are directed to an extensive pyramidal judicial structure at the pinnacle of which sits a single, multi-person court. Ultimately, since
even an organism as small as the Supreme Court cannot guarantee
perfect consistency, ' implementation is left to a branch that is in
the direct control of a single, elected official. Furthermore, for
reasons that have to do with the difficult problems engendered by
self-reference in systems of thought," inconsistencies are most likely
to develop in situtations where one of the branches is responsible
for reviewing the scope of its own authority. 96
Without belaboring the point, I simply note that if my
arguments elsewhere are correct, Choper's final two proposals utterly misperceive the true function of the Court and of the separation doctrine. The Separation Proposal is wrong because it encourages uncertainty in the system, both because it prohibits the
Court from resolving one of the problems which it is specifically
designed to address and because it encourages the other branches to
seek resolution of those problems by means of the most dangerous
mechanism, self-review. Indeed, I believe that this is as true of the
less onerous but no less dangerous political question doctrine as it is
of Choper's somewhat more absolute Separation Proposal. The
Judicial Proposal, on the other hand, asserts jurisdiction over
precisely those cases from which we can most probably expect
threats to the internal consistency of the system, cases of selfreview. There is, however, no way to avoid those threats entirely,
and it may well be that judicial review of the principles of judicial
jurisdiction is as good a mechanism as any.97 Even so, self-review is
by no means so simple a subject as Choper seems to believe, either
for the judiciary or for the other branches, and it merits substantially closer scrutiny than he provides.

94. Arrow's theorem is applicable to iystems with three or more members. K.
ARROW. supra note 92, at 24.
95. Self-reference is the ability of a system of thought to accommodate
discourse about itself. Examples of self-referent systems include judicial theories that
permit courts to adjudicate questions concerning the limits of their own jurisdiction.
Systems of reasoning which are self-referential are often susceptible to deep internal
uncertainty. Farago, supra note 91 at 223-29; see D. HOFSTADTER, GODEL, ESCHER, BACH
(1979).
96. Farago, supra note 91 at 227.
97.

Farago, supra note 91 at 231-39; Farago, Judicial Cybernetics: The Effects

of Self-Reference in Dworkin's Rights Thesis, 14 VAL. U.L.
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A further difficulty is also related to the problem of selfreview. The Court is often faced with cases in which there are one
or more threshold separation questions of the sort Choper would
hold nonjusticiable. In these cases, oversight of the other branches
necessarily becomes oversight of the Court's own jurisdiction, for it
cannot avoid somehow answering the threshold questions if it is to
reach the issues that even Choper believes would properly be before
it. For example, Choper discusses at some length the removal power
of the President. 8 There are numerous positions which are filled by
presidential appointment and ratified by Senate approval. The issue
has periodically arisen as to whether the President may unilaterally
remove such appointees, or whether that, too, requires congressional
action. The Constitution, of course, is totally silent in this regard.
And Professor Choper argues that the Court should decline to
become involved in such a dispute." Without judicial intervention,
however, the war between the branches might well escalate. If the
position at issue were, say, Attorney General, Congress might pass
a funding bill which would prohibit the Acting Attorney General
from spending any funds without the express approval of the ousted
individual. A Justice Department vendor might then sue for payment of a debt contracted after the effective date of the funding bill.
How can the Court act on the contract claim unless it presupposes
some resolution of the separation questions?
The example is admittedly attenuated, but the principle it expresses is not. A battle between the President and Congress is a
political fact that will almost always ripple outward to set off other
disputes. The farther away from the initial dispute we get, or the
longer that that dispute drags on (as it would were the Court not to
intercede), the likelier it will be that other claims, not sounding in
the separation of powers but impossible to adjudicate without at
least implicit resolution of the separation issue, will be presented to
the Court. And these will force the Court either to become involved
in separation issues otherwise proscribed or to revise and limit further its own jurisdiction.
We may wonder, moreover, what sort of political theory would
grant the Court jurisdiction to hear cases to which both it and
another branch are parties, but which would deny it jurisdiction
over cases in which it is not involved. Certainly if Choper's aversion

98. J; CHOPER, supra note 1, at 330-34.
99. Id
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to the Court's autocratic antimajoritarianism has any force at all it
should serve to prohibit judicial decision-making in those cases
where the judiciary itself is an interested party. Even dictators can
be benevolent when their own interests are not implicated. Yet it
strains the imagination to believe that the Court will be totally impartial in determining conflicts between its own interests and those
of Congress or the President. Professor Choper responds to this by
hinting that the due process claim which he rejects everywhere else,
even with respect to the separation of powers disputes that do not
involve the judiciary, may be acceptable here. Perhaps, he suggests,
the Court may have a duty to become involved because there is a
constitutionally-based individual right to judicial process. 00
Well, a sucker is born every minute, and there may well be
people who believe that the judiciary is so sacrosanct that citizens
have an absolute right to have their case heard, even by politicallyappointed redneck judges presiding over frontier courts. And these
same people may believe that they have no right to rely on a
coherent social contract or on the constitutionally-mandated decentralization of government decision-making. But nothing in Professor
Choper's book convinces me that the Court's interests are based any
more directly on individual rights than are those of the states, or of
the Congress, or of the President.' If judicial interests are not based
on individual rights, which Professor Choper puts forth as somehow
paramount, what justification can be found for sacrificing the
Court's credibility in rights-based decisions (the fragility argument)
in order to protect the judiciary's less vital self-interest? Yet, if
100. Id. at 388-93.
101. Professor Choper seems to feel that the Court's interests are worthy of
protection. Id at 384. This raises a disturbing problem. What is the source of their
worth? If it is rights-based, then he must believe that the Court's interests differ from
those of the states in a way that he never articulates. But if they are policy-based, and
therefore less critical than the protection of individual rights, how can he justify risking the Court's integrity, as the fragility claim insists he would in any constitutional
adjudication? The difficulty is that the argument somehow seems to equate all three
types of claims-individual rights, states' rights, and judicial rights. Thus, since the
states are represented in Congress but the courts and the citizenry are not, he sees no
need to protect the first, and is therefore willing to sacrifice them in order to save the
last two. But if all three sound in rights, then none can legitimately be sacrificed on
the basis of that kind of exigent reasoning. If none sound in rights, as seems the most
coherent logical explanation of Choper's thesis, then we will want to repeat and extend
the inquiry into what, precisely, Professor Choper thinks a constitution is. Why should
individual claims be protected if they have no autonomous legitimacy? Finally, if individual rights are rights, but the others are not, then the extended balancing between
fragility and representation in which Professor Choper engages is conceptually inappropriate.
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alternatively all of these interests are based on individual rights,
what justification is there for denying the Court jurisdiction in any
of them?
CONCLUSION: THE VICES OF PRAGMATISM

I find, therefore, signficant lapses in each of Professor Choper's
major proposals. I cannot accept his unreasoned majoritarianism, his
seemingly inconsistent respect for the protection of individual rights
(without extending these to include, as I would urge, the institutional rights they imply), his belief in the fragility of the Court, his
dual-track hermeneutics in federalism cases, his unwillingness to involve the Court in the sort of separation of powers cases for which
it is most expressly designed, or his eagerness to involve the Court
in those cases for which it is least likely to find an adequate solution.
Fundamentally, however, I must return to the point at which I
began. JudicialReview and the National PoliticalProcess is an object lesson in the central role that legal theory necessarily plays in
explicating legal practice. Virtually all of the gaps in this
remarkably well-documented and otherwise thorough book are attributable to Professor Choper's failure to articulate the
jurisprudence on which he relies. Inconsistencies, circular reasoning,
reliance on the force of authority rather than of argument, all of
of a failure to identify and
these are almost inevitable consequences
02
adhere to a set of initial premises.
And there is a worse danger still. Without an underlying
theory, Professor Choper is able to conclude without addressing
some of the most important functions of the Supreme Court's role
within the social contract that we have a right to see enforced. The
Court is a powerful force for reassurance and legitimacy, even when
its determinations go temporarily unheeded. It contributes to the
certainty and stability on which we can found an allegiance to a polity whose terms we did not ourselves forge. It provides a healing,
102. As should be evident from this essay, yet another danger of leaving one's
premises unarticulated is that frustrated jurisprudentially-oriented critics will find
themselves filling in the blanks. The justification for their doing so is simply that it is
impossible to make an argument without at least some minimal underlying theory, so
the failure to articulate that theory is an invitation to seek it inferentially. To the extent that my attempts to do so fall short of accuracy (which, I fear, is considerable), I
can only plead that in having done so I have demonstrated yet another reason why
Judicial Review and the National Political Process would be better served if its
theory had been clearly set out in its text.
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principled understanding of the issues that have the greatest potential to disrupt the entire political system, and in so doing it keeps
our government firmly yoked to the underlying theory by which it
is driven. Indeed, it is here that Professor Choper's unwillingness to
express his jurisprudential assumptions takes its greatest toll, for it
is in this way that his fragility claim transforms one of the Court's
greatest strengths into an apparently crippling weakness: Certainly,
he is correct in identifying the hostility that judicial review
engenders. That sort of hositilty is endemic to any social system
which permits government action without the unanimous consent of
the governed. It is the Court's great virtue-indeed perhaps its
greatest virtue-that it transports the violence of those feelings
from the battleground of warring factions to the intellectually fecund field of principled jurisprudential discourse. 3
John M. Farago*t
103. See Rostow, The Democratic Characterof Judicial Review, 66 HARV. L.
REV. 193, 208 (1952) ("the Justices are inevitably teachers in a vital national seminar").
* Assistant Dean and Assistant Professor of Law, Valparaiso University
School of Law.
t I gratefully acknowledge the helpful comments and suggestions of my colleagues Dierdre Burgman, Paul Cox, Matthew Downs, and Jack Hiller.
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